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NOTES
THE SUPREME COURT'S
DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE
AMERICAN ELECTORATE: ADVOCATING
THE APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY
WHEN REVIEWING STATE BALLOT
ACCESS LAWS AND POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING
The United States Constitution guarantees the right to speech'
and association;2 two integral components of the constitutionally
protected right to vote. The fundamental right to vote ensures a
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech.. . ."); see also Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
221 (1989) (striking down California laws prohibiting political parties from endorsing can-
didates in party primaries); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (describing free
speech as right which makes every other guaranteed freedom possible).
2 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (stating that right to
associate is inextricably linked with freedom of expression), rev'd, 360 U.S. 240 (1959); see
also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (noting that implied right
'not to associate" can be exercised without discriminating against suspect classes). See gen-
erally LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITTrIONAL LAW § 10-11 (1978) (recognizing right
to associate as "a right to join with others to pursue goals independently protected by the
First Amendment").
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (stating that "[the electors shall meet in their respective
states; and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President.. ."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 2 (denying representation to those states who deny qualified citizens right to vote by
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sufficient electorate and an unrestricted pool of candidates who
are actively concerned about substantive issues.4 As the frame-
work for a republican form of government, the Constitution pro-
vides for state sovereignty in the areas of state elections5 and rep-
resentative apportionment.6 This independence, however, has
opened the door for state legislators to create state ballot access
laws 7 and political gerrymandersY8
decreasing amount of representation "in the proportion which the number of such male
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such
state"); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (forbidding right to vote being "denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (preventing gender discrimination in voting rights); U.S.
CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (eliminating financial restrictions on right to vote by stating that
failure to pay poll taxes or any other tax is not grounds to deny right to vote); U.S. CONST.
amend. XXVI, § 1 (prohibiting voting laws based on age for those over age eighteen); see
also Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (stating that right to vote is
fundamental right and, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (noting that right to vote in state elections is implicit,
though not expressly stated in Constitution); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 385
(1915) (observing "[wie regard it as equally unquestionable that the right to have one's vote
counted is as open to protection by Congress as the right to put a ballot in the box"); Ex
parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1884) (stating Congress has power to punish states
that violate election laws as well as protect congressional elections from violence, corrup-
tion, or fraud); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 164 (1875) (finding that states conferred
right to vote, but federal government protects this right). But see TRIBE, supra note 2, § 13-
10 (noting that some restrictions on right to vote actually serve interests of democracy). See
generally RICHARD CLAUDE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 23-36 (1970)
(discussing derivation of right to vote).
4 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (noting fundamental character of right
to vote stating "[o]ther rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is under-
mined"); see also Jackson Williams, The Courts and Partisan Gerrymandering: Recent
Cases on Legislative Reapportionment, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 563, 595 (1994) (noting how gerry-
mandering can "stifle debate" in districts where incumbents face no opposition).
5 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. This section provides that "[t]he United States shall guar-
antee to every State in this Union a Republican form of Government. . . ." Id.; see also
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970). The Court stated that "[n]o function is more
essential to the separate and independent existence of the States and their governments
than the power to determine within the limits of the Constitution the qualifications of their
own voters for state, county and municipal offices and the nature of their own machinery
for filling local public offices." Id.; Todd J. Zywicki, Federal Judicial Review of State Ballot
Access Regulations: Escape from the Political Thicket, 20 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 87, 92-94
(1994). The power of the states to govern their own elections is fundamental and only
through the Republican Guarantee Clause may the federal government interfere. Id.
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (mandating that number of representatives be in pro-
portion to population); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (providing guidelines for number of
representatives in Congress); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (commenting on
power of states under Article II to pass laws regulating selection of electors, but with ca-
veat that laws must conform with other Constitutional provisions). See generally TRIBE,
supra note 2, § 13-10 (noting Constitution confers to states, in Art. I, certain powers re-
garding federal elections and because no such powers are conferred upon Congress regard-
ing state elections these are solely in hands of states).
7 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 16-341C+6 (1997) (limiting time in which petition signa-
tures may be collected to ten days); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6430 (West 1997) (requiring that
those who sign petition swear their affiliation to party named on petition); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 15, § 300(c)(2) (1997) (requiring social security number to accompany petition signa-
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Ballot access laws limit a political opponent's opportunity to
challenge incumbents,9 while political gerrymandering thwarts
the ability of the voter to challenge the incumbent party. 10 As a
result, state legislators have unwittingly compromised this funda-
mental right to vote." In light of this legislative encroachment,
there have been numerous judicial challenges.1 2 The Supreme
Court, however, has not ruled in this area, nor has the appropri-
tures); MICH. Comp. LAWs. § 168.685(1) (1997) (establishing minimum number of petition
signatures of independent and third party candidates wishing to appear on ballot); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 7-11-80(3)(c) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997) (requiring affidavit numbers to accom-
pany petition signatures).
8 See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring) (defining
gerrymandering as deliberate distortion of district boundaries and populations for political
purposes).
9 See Williams, 393 U.S. at 33 (finding Ohio election laws unduly burdensome on polit-
ical groups attempting to get on election ballot thus denying "the 'disaffected' not only a
choice of leadership but a choice on the issues as well"); see also Bradley Smith, Judicial
Protection of Ballot-Access Rights: Third Parties Need Not Apply, 28 HARV. J. ON LEOIS.
167, 196-97 (1991) (noting that ballot access laws burden associational rights of political
parties, draining such candidates of finances, volunteers and enthusiasm). See generally
TRIBE, supra note 2, at § 13-20 (stating while ballot access laws are not unconstitutional
per se, they become invalid once they infringe on constitutionally protected rights).
10 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 169 (1986) (defining political gerrymandering as
when electoral system is arranged in manner that will consistently degrade voter's influ-
ence on political process as whole); see also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 740-44
(1973) (upholding Connecticut reapportionment plan drawn around party voting habits).
See generally Pittman v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 64 F.3d 1098, 1101 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting
limitations on candidacy may infringe upon right to vote), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2497
(1996); POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990) VIII
[hereinafter POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING] (noting that political groups cannot achieve ma-
jority status in spite of electoral strength if there exists "egregious political gerrymander-
ing"); Jeffrey G. Hamilton, Comment, Deeper into the Political Thicket: Racial Gerryman-
dering and the Supreme Court, 43 EMORY L.J. 1519, 1542 (1994) (noting that political party
in control of state legislature uses political gerrymandering to maintain position of power).
11 See ZYwicKi, supra note 5, at 104 n.82 (stating that theory behind this amendment is
"to leave the power of regulating the suffrage with the people or Legislatures of the States,
and not to assume to regulate it by any clause of the Constitution"). But see Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1997) (prohibiting state practices which
serve to discriminate against disadvantaged groups); Luben v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716
(1974) (holding "the right to vote is heavily burdened if that vote may be cast only for one of
two candidates in a primary election at time when other candidates are clamoring for a
place on the ballot"). See generally Smith, supra note 9, at 195 (stating that right to associ-
ate is closely related to free speech and culmination of both are necessary for "effective
advocacy of both public and private points of view") (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel.
Patterson, 375 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)). See, e.g., Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 295 (1992)
(holding statute requiring more petition signatures to get on ballot in multidistrict political
subdivision than were required to get on statewide ballot unconstitutional); Williams, 393
U.S. at 30 (finding Ohio laws at issue burdened rights to effectively vote and associate "for
the advancement of political beliefs").
12 See Williams, 393 U.S. at 29 (confronting issue of state ballot access law for first time);
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (noting that absent this fundamental right
"[o]ther rights, even the most basic, are illusory"); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340
(1960) (dealing with racial minority vote dilution for first time). See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (holding that adjudication of challenge to apportionment scheme does
not violate political question doctrine).
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ate standard of review been resolved.13 The Court's hesitance to
consistently apply strict scrutiny to both state ballot access laws
and state legislative redistricting is attributed to its desire to pre-
serve a republican form of government. 14 In upholding this nota-
ble goal, however, the Court has allowed the states to infringe
upon freedom of speech 15 and association' 6 and, as a result, the
right to vote.' 7 Due to the failure to apply one standard of review,
confusion has manifested among state legislators and judges,
keeping the door open to litigation."i Consequently, the American
people have suffered from vote dilution' 9  and political
discrimination.2 0
13 See Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating the Electoral Process: Judging Politics: The Elu-
sive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1643, 1646-47 (1993)
(arguing that Court's standard in Davis v. Bandemer is "fundamentally unworkable and
incorporate such ambiguous and unclear commands as to be unfit for any manageable form
ofjudicial application"); Smith, supra note 9, at 193 (arguing that Supreme Court relies on
political theory rather than impact state ballot access laws have); Stephen J. Thomas, The
Lack of Judicial Direction in Political Gerrymandering: An Invitation to Chaos Following
the 1990 Census, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1067, 1068 (1989) (noting court decisions have not pro-
vided sufficient guidance to state legislatures).
14 See e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (noting that states are entitled to
regulate elections to make them fair and honest and free from chaos); Gaffney, 412 U.S. at
751 (recognizing that state reapportionment is better handled by local legislatures or other
state entities selected to perform such tasks).
15 U.S. CONST. amend I.
16 See U.S. CONST. amend I. (providing freedom of association); see also U.S. CONST.
amend XIV (applying federally guarenteed rights to states); Williams, 393 U.S. at 30 (rec-
ognizing that right to political association and right to vote are "among our most precious
freedoms").
17 See Storer, 415 U.S. at 729 (referring to Williams-Kramer-Dunn rule which states that
any "burdens on the right to vote or associate for political purposes are constitutionally
suspect and invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and under the Equal
Protection Clause unless essential to serve a compelling state interest").
18 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 172-73 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating
that Court's failure to articulate clear doctrine in area of political gerrymandering serves to
open floodgates of litigation); see also Brian L. Porto, The Constitution and the Ballot Box:
Supreme Court Jurisprudence and Ballot Access for Independent Candidates, 7 BYU J.
PuB. L. 281, 282 (1993) (noting that legal commentators shared belief that state ballot
access cases were reviewed with different standards of scrutiny and thus failed to articu-
late clear and consistent standard); Smith, supra note 9, at 186-87 (noting that confusion
engendered by two Supreme Court cases using different standards of review); Terry Smith,
Election Law: Election Laws and First Amendment Freedoms-Confusion and Clarification
by the Supreme Court, 1988 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 597, 610, 621-22 (1988) (arguing that
Supreme Court's failure to use one standard of scrutiny in examining state ballot access
laws has created confusion in lower courts).
19 See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 483 (1968) (extending idea of"one person,
one vote" to local governmental units with "general responsibility"); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 567 (1964) (stating vote is diluted when it does not have same weight as someone
else's vote in same state); see also TRIBE, supra note 2, §§ 13-14 (explaining that Reynolds v.
Sims brought cases dealing with state legislative districting within "compass of one person,
one vote").
20 See generally Michael E. Lewyn, When is Cumulative Voting Preferable to Single-
Member Districting?, 25 N.M. L. REV. 197, 201 (1995) [hereinafter Cumulative Voting] (re-
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This Note argues that despite the goals of a republican form of
government, the Supreme Court must take the steps necessary to
ensure that all Americans are free from the political discrimina-
tion present jurisprudence permits. Part One analyzes the
Supreme Court's review of state ballot access laws and its effect on
recent lower court decisions. Part Two examines the Supreme
Court's review of alleged political gerrymanders and the contin-
ued allowance of political discrimination by the lower courts. Part
Three presents arguments demonstrating that the Supreme Court
should take affirmative steps that will not usurp the power of the
individual states, but will provide a measuring stick for both legis-
lators and judges. Finally, this Note concludes that the Supreme
Court, using the right to vote as a basis, should invoke strict scru-
tiny as the standard of review when faced with challenges to state
ballot access laws and political gerrymandering.
I. ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT CASES REVIEWING STATE
BALLOT ACCESS LAWS
The Supreme Court has not provided meaningful guidance for
reviewing state ballot access laws. 21 In reviewing these laws, the
Court has applied varying standards of scrutiny22 including ra-
tional basis, strict scrutiny and a multi-factor balancing test.23
Most cases brought before the Court relating to state ballot access
ducing political competition reduces voter turn-out); Michael E. Lewyn, How Radical is
Lani Guinier?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 927, 936 (1994) [hereinafter How Radical] (reviewing LANI
GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DE-
MOCRACY (1994)) (noting that by increasing number of "safe" districts gerrymandering low-
ers voter interest and voter turnout).
21 See Zywicki, supra note 6, at 89 (arguing that Supreme Court decisions regarding
state regulation of access to ballot are random "both with regards to the level of review to
be applied and with regard to how various fact patterns are related"); see also Comment,
Fusion Candidacies, Disaggregation and Freedom of Association, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1302,
1310 (1996) [hereinafter Fusion Candidacies] (noting Supreme Court's lack of guidance in
electoral regulation cases).
22 See, e.g., Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992) (requiring that any severe restric-
tion imposed by state be of compelling importance); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 441-
42 (1971) (failing to apply any sort of traditional standard); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 31 (1968) (applying standard of compelling state interest to justify state's imposition on
right to vote).
23 See generally Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (applying 'flexible' stan-
dard imposed in Anderson); Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442 (finding state duty to protect political
processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395
U.S. 621,626 (1969) (holding right to vote may only be denied to class of voters where there
is compelling state interest). See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)
(establishing multi-factor balancing test which weighs character and magnitude of as-
serted injury protected by First and Fourteenth Amendments against state interest).
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laws involved political parties attempting to get on the state ballot
for primary elections.24 The various standards of review utilized
reveal the Court's inability to determine whether multiple candi-
dates to choose from or a limited number of political parties es-
pousing the traditional, and seemingly similar rhetoric, is best for
the people.25 It appears to be in the best interest of the American
political system for the Supreme Court to open up the ballot to
more candidates. With more choices, it seems logical that the
electorate's right to vote becomes meaningful. If the Court contin-
ues to perpetuate the status quo by not utilizing a single standard
of review, Americans are left without meaningful choices.
A. History of the Supreme Court's Review of State Ballot Access
Laws
Storer v. Brown 26 was an early Supreme Court case in which the
Court utilized a low level of scrutiny with respect to California
election laws that allegedly placed an unconstitutional burden on
independent candidates' access to the ballot .2  The Storer Court
24 See Norman, 502 U.S. at 279 (requiring 25,000 voters to sign petition for establish-
ment of new political party in Illinois); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 (requiring independent
candidate to file nominating petition in March to appear on ballot in November); Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 724 (1974) (forbidding independent candidate from appearing on bal-
lot in California if she/he was registered with another political party within one year imme-
diately proceeding primary election); Jenness, 403 U.S. at 432 (holding Georgia law requir-
ing nominee of political body to gather signatures from five percent of eligible voters to gain
admission to ballot unconstitutional); Williams, 393 U.S. at 24-25 (requiring new party to
obtain petitions signed by fifteen percent of qualified voters who voted in previous Ohio
gubernatorial election). See generally Darla L. Schaffer, Ballot Access Laws, 73 DENV. U. L.
REV. 657, 659-64 (1996) (discussing evolution of Anderson test); Thomas H. Dupree, Jr.,
Note, Exposing the Stealth Candidate: Disclosure After Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Commis-
sion, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1211, 1223 (1996) (stating that election regulation laws are subject
to balancing test); Fusion Candidacies, supra note 21, at 1310-13 (arguing that Anderson
test is more conceptual than empirical).
25 See Mark E. Rush, Voters'Rights and the Legal Status of American Political Parties, 9
J.L. & POL. 487, 500 (1993) (conflicting views of Court range from "the right to choose
among diverse, ideologically distinct options on election day" to having few select candi-
dates that have opportunity to win); Rick G. Strange, Application of Voting Rights Act to
Communities Containing Two or More Minority Groups - When is the Whole Greater than
the Sum of the Parts?, 20 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 95, 103, 121 (1989) (discussing consequences
of Supreme Court's failure to provide trial courts with meaningful guidance in apportion-
ment cases); Fusion Candidacies, supra note 21, at 1317-18 (criticizing Sixth Circuit deci-
sion banning use of independent party designation as infringing on voting rights of sup-
porters of independent candidates).
26 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
27 See id. at 729-30 (noting that restrictions on voting rights are not per se unconstitu-
tional); see also William Kirschner, Fusion and the Associational Rights of Minor Political
Parties, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 683, 690 (1995) (reviewing recent Supreme Court definition of
political party autonomy); Dominic A. lannicola, Jr., Note, People v. Constitution: The Con-
gressional Term Limit Debate and a Constitutional Definition of Qualification, 1994 U. ILL.
19961 DISENFRANCHISEMENT
reasoned that the state's interest in preventing "splintered parties
and unrestrained factionalism" was integral to providing a mean-
ingful election.2" The Court acknowledged, however, that up to
that point (1974) it had failed to provide any sort of "litmus-paper
test" for determining the validity of these restrictions.2 9
The first attempt by the Court to provide a more concrete test
came a decade later in Anderson v. Celebrezze.30 The Anderson
Court introduced a multi-factor balancing test which was a form
of intermediate scrutiny.31 The Court held that an Ohio law im-
posing early filing dates on independent candidates excluded
political late-comers 32 and thus infringed upon the fundamental
right to vote.3 Anderson required courts to consider the character
L. REV. 683, 690 (1994) (evaluating holding in Storer for its relevant value to term limit
debate); Jacqueline Ricciani, Note, Burdick v. Takushi: The Anderson Balancing Test to
Sustain Prohibitions on Write-In Voting, 13 PACE L. REV. 949, 959-60 (1994) (discussing
Court's distinction of Storer from other cases evaluating voting statutes using "totality
approach").
28 See Storer, 415 U.S. at 736 (concluding that state's interest in preventing splintered
parties compelling and outweighed interest of candidate postponing their decision to run
for office); see also Fusion Candidacies, supra note 21, at 1324 (advocating preservation of
two party system); Michele Logan, Note, The Right to Write-In: Voting Rights and the First
Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 727, 749 (1993) (contending that ban on write-in votes does
not avoid splintering of parties).
29 See Storer, 415 U.S. at 730 (noting rule created is not "self-executing" and does not
really enable Court to predict outcome of any specific case); see also Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
U.S. 51, 59-61 (1973) (striking down provisions similar to those upheld in Rosario, with
only difference being deadline for changing party registration); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410
U.S. 752, 761-62 (1973) (upholding provision requiring primary voters to register as party
members in specified time frame to prevent interparty raiding); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 353-60 (1972) (invalidating Tennessee's one-year residence requirement to vote);
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972) (recognizing that state has legitimate interest
in regulating number of candidates on ballot); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971)
(concluding that important state interest support requiring challengers show "significant
modicum of support" before getting on ballot in order to prevent frivolous or fraudulent
candidacies).
30 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
31 See id. at 789 (stating constitutional challenge to state election laws entails "analytic
process" and not "litmus-paper test"); see also Fishbeck v. Hechler, 85 F.3d 162, 169 (4th
Cir. 1996) (using balancing test, majority did not find primary-eve filing deadline severe
restriction on minor parties' access to ballot); Coalition for Free and Open Elections Prohi-
bition Party v. McElderry, 48 F.3d 493, 501 (10th Cir.) (applying presumption that states
can regulate electoral process within reason to find that Oklahoma's interest against write-
in voting outweighed voters' interests in favor of it), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 63 (1995);
Schultz v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 633 N.Y.S.2d 915, 921 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995)
(noting method of determining constitutionality of New York's system of ballot access). See
generally Thomas S. Chase, Early Filing Deadline Unconstitutional: A Trend Toward Strict
Scrutiny in Ballot Access Cases - Anderson v. Celebrezze, 18 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 24, 28
n.23 (1984) (noting Supreme Court has acknowledged that results in one ballot access case
will differ from another because analysis is fact specific).
32 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 792, 794 (1983) (filing deadline for non-
party candidates result in election campaigns being "monopolized by existing political
parties").
33 See id. at 790 (noting impact of early filing deadline on "independent-minded voters").
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and magnitude of the asserted injury and the constitutional rights
that were allegedly violated.34 In conjunction with this, courts
must also evaluate the interests asserted by the state to justify
the burden imposed.35 Since this standard of review is so cumber-
some in its application, s6 courts must engage in a fact intensive
analysis for each case, often leading to inconsistent results.37
1. Norman v. Reed 38 - The Supreme Court's Application of
Strict Scrutiny
Although many lower courts and legal scholars contend that the
multi-factor balancing test announced in Anderson is the prevail-
ing standard,3 9 the Supreme Court has not adhered to it. In Nor-
man v. Reed,4 ° the Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis to test
the validity of an Illinois ballot access law requiring the state to
show a compelling interest in limiting access of new political par-
ties to the ballot.41 The challenged law required new political par-
ties to obtain a certain number of signatures before a candidate
could be placed on the ballot.42 The Court held that the state
failed to meet its burden of proving a compelling state interest
34 See id. at 789 (denoting first part of multi-factor balancing test).
35 See id. (denoting second part of multi-factor balancing test).
36 See Chase, supra note 31, at 28-30 (asserting that lower courts are unable to decide
which standard of review to apply regarding independent candidates in state elections);
Zywicki, supra note 5, at 116 (remarking on lack of certainty with respect to appropriate
standard of review and how various state interests should be weighed).37 See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1973) (indicating that even courts cannot
predict results in these cases); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) (stating that "[i]n
approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the extent
and nature of their impact on voters"); see also Chase, supra note 31, at 31 (noting that
Supreme Court's failure to establish coherent standard has resulted in inconsistent stan-
dard of review).
38 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
39 See Zywicki, supra note 5, at 116 (noting Anderson multi-factor balancing test has
become main test applied to both state and federal regulations).
40 See Norman, 502 U.S. at 279.
41 See id. at 288-94 (holding that state must show compelling interest to limit access of
new political parties to ballot); see also Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 116 S. Ct.
1186, 1210 (1996) (applying strict scrutiny to registration fee imposed by Republican
Party); Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 214 (1989) (holding
California did not have compelling interest in infringing First Amendment rights when it
imposed restrictions on internal policy of political parties); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
30-31 (1968) (finding that imposition for new political parties to be placed on Ohio state
ballots violate equal protection).
42 See Norman, 502 U.S. at 282 (referring to Illinois statute requiring new political party
to obtain signatures of either 25,000 voters or 1% of number of votes at preceding election
in order to appear on election ballot); see also Kirchner, supra note 27, at 689-90 (analogiz-
ing statute struck down in Norman to those banning fusion); Fusion Candidacies, supra
note 21, at 1337 n.98 (discussing facts in Norman); Ricciani, supra note 27, at 977-979
(suggesting Norman was threshold test to trigger strict scrutiny analysis).
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and, therefore, the statute was unconstitutional.4 3 The Court rea-
soned that state limitations on the ability to organize by those
with similar political ideologies must be justified by a compelling
state interest, as these organizations enable voters to "express
their own political preferences."44 Additionally, if the restriction
was "severe", the Court required that the restriction be narrowly
tailored to achieve that compelling interest.45
The Norman Court continued this activist approach by sug-
gesting how to deal with states' interests.4" The Court found that
the avoidance of voter confusion4 7 and ensuring that new parties
have some degree of support 4 were compelling state interests.
Strict scrutiny combined with the belief that a multitude of candi-
dates creates a meaningful vote renders the Court's approach the
most amenable to protecting the right to vote.49 It is asserted that
invoking strict scrutiny analysis forces legislators to open up the
political process to more contenders so that the people, and not
those who currently hold political power, decide who is a qualified
candidate.
43 See Williams, 393 U.S. at 31. This was the first case to apply strict scrutiny to state
ballot access laws. Id. The Court believed that if there are only majority party candidates
on the ballot then the right to vote is "heavily burdened." Id. There is a denial of equal
protection when a new political party is required to obtain fifteen percent of the amount of
ballots cast in the prior year's gubernatorial election in order to get on the ballot. Id.
44 See Norman, 502 U.S. at 288 (noting Court has required severe restrictions to be nar-
rowly drawn to serve compelling state interest).
45 See id.; see also Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184
(1979) (noting case where Supreme Court first required any severe restriction imposed by
ballot access laws to be narrowly tailored to achieve compelling state interest).
46 Norman, 502 U.S. at 290 (proposing methods for how to avoid electoral confusion).
47 See id. at 290 (suggesting that Illinois require its candidates get permission from es-
tablished party they seek to represent to use party name to avoid "suppressing the growth
of small parties").
48 See id. at 293-94 (suggesting that Illinois might have employed alternatives to chal-
lenged statute).
49 Id. at 280 (stating that right to create and develop new political parties derives from
First and Fourteenth Amendments and "advances the constitutional interest of like-
minded voters to gather in pursuit of common political ends, thus enlarging all voters' op-
portunities to express their own political preferences"); see also Morse v. Republican Party
of Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1210 (1996) (recognizing that right for members of political
party to associate is basic constitutional freedom); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,
395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969) (addressing restriction on voting rights); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (proclaiming that every citizen has inalienable right to participate in
political process of their state).
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2. Burdick v. Takushi
50
Shortly after Norman, the Supreme Court ruled on Hawaii's
prohibition on write-in voting.5 In Burdick v. Takushi,52 the
Court upheld this prohibition by elaborating on the Anderson
multi-factor balancing test which seemingly combined the stan-
dards used in Norman and Anderson.53 The Court stated that if a
severe burden was imposed on First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights, the law would be subject to strict scrutiny. 4 If, however,
the restriction imposed by the election law was reasonable and
nondiscriminatory, the state may put forth a mere important reg-
ulatory interest as justification.5 5 This dual standard coupled with
inconsistent analysis serves to exacerbate the uncertainty faced
by lower courts as to the appropriate standard of review.
B. Lower Court Treatment of State Ballot Access Laws
Recent cases reviewing state ballot access laws exemplify the
confusion over which standard of review should be utilized.56 In
Rockefeller v. Powers,5 7 the Second Circuit reviewed a New York
State ballot access law for a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. 58 The law required Republican candidates, who were not
officially endorsed by the state supported Republican leadership,
to collect the lesser of five percent or 1,250 signatures of registered
50 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See id. at 434-36 (stating standard to be applied depends upon extent to which chal-
lenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights); see also Fishbeck v.
Hechler, 85 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1996) (calling such test "sliding scale analysis"). See
generally Benjamin D. Black, Developments in the State Regulation of Major and Minor
Political Parties, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 146 (1996) (noting that issue of whether electoral
system provides voters with adequate choices among candidates did not factor in court's
determination of whether right to vote was infringed).
54 See Norman, 502 U.S. at 289.
55 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (recognizing reasonable restric-
tions imposed by states are those aimed at maintaining fair, honest, and orderly elections).
56 See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1951 (1996) (stating "searching inquiry" is
necessary to find applicable level of review in redistricting cases); Illinois State Bd. of Elec-
tions v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979) (invoking strict scrutiny to re-
view Illinois requirements for independent candidates); O'Callaghan v. Alaska, 914 P.2d
1250, 1254 (Alaska 1996) (concluding that subjecting even voting requirement to strict
scrutiny would tie hands of states seeking fair elections); Legislative Redistricting Cases,
629 A.2d 646, 646 (Md. Ct. Appeals 1993) (demonstrating arduous process undertaken by
court when reviewing validity of redistricting plan).
57 74 F.3d 1367, 1367 (2d Cir. 1995) (reviewing New York State ballot access law).
58 See id. at 1370 (noting gravaman of plaintiffs complaint).
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Republicans to gain access to the primary ballot.59 In applying a
rational basis level of scrutiny, the Second Circuit ruled the law
was constitutional, noting that the state's burden of proving an
"important" interest was met when it required assurances that
the challenging candidates have "a modicum of support."6 °
A year later, the same parties came before the court, but this
time with respect to the unanswered issue of whether the New
York ballot access rules constituted an undue burden on the right
to vote in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.'
The Court held that New York's ballot access law did in fact pose
significant difficulties for certain candidates to gather a sufficient
number of registered Republicans to sign the requisite petition.6 2
The court changed the focus of its review by examining whether
the New York ballot access rules "unduly" burdened the right to
vote, thus violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 3
The 1996 case of Fishbeck v. Heckler64 demonstrated how the
multi-factor balancing test set forth in Anderson leads to undesir-
able results.6 5 In Fishbeck, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a
West Virginia law requiring qualifying petitions to be filed on the
eve of the primary election was constitutional. 6 The court, in find-
59 See N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 6-136 (McKinney 1996) (requiring that petitions for any of-
fice must be signed by fifteen thousand signatures or five percent, whichever is less, of
enrolled voters of party in New York).
60 See Rockefeller, 74 F.3d at 1382-83 (stating that if there is no proof of invidious dis-
crimination nor deprivation of right to vote, strict scrutiny should not be applied); see also
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) (finding important interest of states in requir-
ing preliminary showing of significant modicum of support before placing candidate on bal-
lot); McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (applying rational basis be-
cause right to vote was not infringed); Hewes v. Abrams, 884 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating
case law of Second Circuit has established rational basis review as appropriate for review
of state ballot access laws). See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432-34 (1992) (not-
ing petitioner's erroneous assumption that laws imposing burden on right to vote are auto-
matically subject to strict scrutiny, instead asserting that flexible standard applies).
61 See Rockefeller, 78 F.3d at 45 (holding that New York ballot access rules are far more
burdensome than those adopted by virtually every other state).
62 See id. at 45 (concluding that contacting sufficient number of registered Republicans
was made difficult by New York requirements).
63 See id. (addressing First Amendment issues); see also Rockefeller v. Powers, 917 F.
Supp. 155 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (referring to Storer test as "simple and sensible", yet advocating
need for compelling state interest when such schemes infringe upon right to vote).
64 See Fishbeck v. Hechler, 85 F.3d 162, 162 (4th Cir. 1996) (reviewing West Virginia
ballot access law).
65 See id. at 165; see also Texas Indep. Party v. Kirk, 84 F.3d 178, 187 (5th Cir. 1996)
(distinguishing between ballot access and voter registration deadlines).
66 See Fishbeck, 85 F.3d at 168-69. The majority, in upholding the ballot access restric-
tions at issue, ignored the fact that independent candidates achieved diminished success
getting onto the primary ballot ever since the state imposed ballot access restrictions. Id.
There was an abundance of non-historical, non-statistical evidence, which showed the se-
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ing that the restriction was not severe enough to warrant strict
scrutiny, applied the Anderson multi-factor balancing test.6" The
court weighed the plaintiffs alleged injury against the state's in-
terest in requiring third party and independent candidates to
demonstrate some support from the community. 68 The court found
the restrictions were not unduly burdensome in light of the state's
valid interest.69
The dissent argued that the majority did not properly apply the
Anderson test because it imposed a burden of proof on the plain-
tiffs that required a showing greater than a severe burden.70 The
dissent found the ballot access restrictions were severe and did
not agree that the justification by the state correlated with the
burden imposed. 7 ' These decisions illustrate the confusion which
prevents consistent application of one standard to voter access
laws.72
II. LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING
A. Political Gerrymandering - The Supreme Court's "Double
Standard"
The fundamental right to vote has also been affected by the
Supreme Court's failure to provide a consistent standard of review
for legislative redistricting. 73 These cases are often based on
claims that electoral districts are politically gerrymandered. 4
verity of the restrictions, that was not considered by the court. Id. According to expert
testimony, "West Virginia's ballot access laws make it the most inaccessible state in the
country for third party and independent candidates." Id. at 169; see also Texas Indep.
Party, 84 F.3d at 187. A provision of the Texas election code requiring candidates to obtain
from all those who sign their petitions voter registration numbers was deemed unconstitu-
tional and unduly burdensome. Id.
67 See Fishbeck, 85 F.3d at 164 (applying Anderson balancing test).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 165 (affirming holding of district court).
70 See id. at 171 (noting court's approach was "inconsistent with the requirements of
Anderson and Burdick" by requiring showing greater than severe burden).
71 Id. at 166.
72 See Mazzucco v. Verderame, No. CV 960382136J, 1996 WL 166732 at *4 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 1996) (adopting flexible approach to find Connecticut ballot access law
unconstitutional).
73 See Williams, supra note 4, at 564 (arguing that courts should be more active and take
steps to end confusion in gerrymandering jurisprudence).
74 See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 114 (1986) (finding that 1981 Indiana reap-
portionment plans constituted political gerrymander intended to disadvantage Democrats);
Gaflhey v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 735 (1973) (noting that despite appearance of political
gerrymandering, redistricting plan was valid); Kirkpatrick v. Priesler, 394 U.S. 526, 526
(1969) (believing Missouri's congressional districts were politically gerrymandered).
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This phenomenon involves the legislature's creation of voting dis-
tricts which unfairly enhance the election of a political group's
candidate, usually the incumbent.75 The major dilemma with re-
spect to political redistricting rulings is the same as that for state
ballot access laws - the application of various levels of scrutiny.76
The Supreme Court consistently applies strict scrutiny for con-
gressional redistricting plans, but fails to apply this standard for
state plans.77 The failure to apply a single standard to all cases
involving redistricting prevents consistent constitutional protec-
tions.78 As Justice Brennan noted in his dissenting opinion of
Gaffney v. Cummings, varying standards allow legislators to stop
striving for perfection when redistricting.79
1. Apportionment of Congressional Districts v.
Apportionment of State Legislative Districts
A comparison of cases challenging the apportionment of con-
gressional districts and those challenging the apportionment of
75 See Evan Geldzahler, Davis v. Bandemer: Remedial Difficulties in Political Gerryman-
dering, 37 EMORY L.J. 443, 443 n.4 (1988) (quoting Supreme Court Justice Powell's dissent
in Davis); see also Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 538 (Fortas, J., concurring) (defining gerryman-
dering as "deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries and populations for
partisan or personal political purposes"); Thomas, supra note 13, at 1068 (defining political
gerrymandering as "purposeful discrimination by one political party against another for
partisan purposes").
76 See, e.g., Karcher v. Dagget, 462 U.S. 725, 732 (1983) (requiring absolute population
equality of congressional districts); Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer,
849 F. Supp. 1022, 1033 (D. Md. 1994) (applying rational basis standard to state legislative
redistricting cases); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 546 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny
to voting districts at issue).
77 See Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 533 (noting justification of history, economic or group
interests were not sufficient reasons for disparities in population-based representation); see
also Wells, 394 U.S. at 546 (noting population variances to create districts with specific
interest orientations is antithetical to mandate of Constitution).
78 See Peter Schuck, Partisan Gerrymandering: A Political Problem Without a Judicial
Solution, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING, supra note 10, at 240. Schuck advocates that a
proportional representation standard be adopted when adjudicating political gerrymander-
ing claims. Id. Proportional representation is defined as the "attempt to secure a represen-
tative assembly reflecting with more or less mathematical exactness the various divisions
in the electorate." Id. at 243 (quoting HANNA PITIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 243
(1967). But see Gordon E. Baker, The Unfinished Reapportionment Revolution, in POLrrICAL
GERRYMANDERING, supra note 10, at 11. The author believes that the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Reynolds v. Sims was intended to provide some flexible guidelines. Id. at 14. Baker
also finds that this standard ofjudicial scrutiny in turn would serve to lessen the amount of
litigation in this area "now that guidelines of tolerable constitutional limits were reason-
ably clear." Id. at 17.
79 See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 779 (concluding that certain range of variances in population
de minimus because encourages "legislators to strive for that range rather than for equality
as nearly as practicable.") (quoting Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531).
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state legislative districts illustrates the Court's inconsistency
("double standard") in its application of strict scrutiny. 0
a. Congressional Districting
The Constitution mandates the principle of proportional repre-
sentation which, in turn, forces courts to examine redistricting
plans with the highest degree of scrutiny."' In the companion
cases of Kirkpatrick v. Preisler2 and Wells v. Rockefeller, 3 the
Supreme Court struck down congressional districting plans in
Missouri and New York, respectively. The Court held that the
states must comply with the constitutional mandate to provide
equal representation for equal numbers of people and justify each
variance.8 4 In Kirkpatrick, the Court found that any variance to
the equal population principle contradicted that mandate.8 5 The
Court applied strict scrutiny and stated that the desire to avoid
the fragmentation of political subdivisions does not justify popula-
tion disparities."6 In Wells, the Court stated that population vari-
80 See Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531 (using strict scrutiny in challenge of equal represen-
tation in congressional districts noting that Art. I § 2 "permits only the limited population
variances ... for which justification is shown"); see also TRIBE, supra note 2, § 13-16 (stat-
ing that strict adherence to population equality goes so far as to not see the need to keep
political subdivisions intact); Abner J. Mikva, Justice Brennan and the Political Process:
Assessing the Legacy of Baker v. Carr, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 691 n.35 (1995) (advocating
adoption of "judicially manageable" standard for adjudicating political gerrymandering
cases); cf Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (combining concepts of"fair and effec-
tive representation for all citizens" and "one person, one vote" for state legislative redis-
tricting plans).
81 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2 (requiring that elected officials are to be proportional with
population of respective state); see also Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531 (stating that Constitu-
tion allows for only limited population variances in creation of congressional districts be-
cause states are to strive for equal representation); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1964) (requiring congressional districts be drawn in compliance with Constitutional man-
dates, so that "as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be
worth as much as another's").
82 See, e.g., Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 533 (reviewing Missouri's 1967 congressional redis-
tricting statute and holding it failed to satisfy constitutional standard because state did not
justify population variances among districts).
83 394 U.S. 542, 542 (1969) (declaring New York congressional districting statute
unconstitutional).
84 See Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530-31 (rejecting Missouri's de minimus approach stating
that it does not adhere to principle of equal representation); see also Wells v. Rockefeller,
394 U.S. 542, 546 (1969) (stating basis for strict scrutiny is to equalize population in all
districts of State, which is not satisfied by equalizing population only within defined sub-
states). But see also Mikva, supra note 80, at 689 (finding fault with Justice Brennan's
strict compliance to numerical equality of district sizes, stating "[t]he Court's exclusive con-
centration upon arithmetic blinds it to the realities of the political process. ..).
85 See Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 533 (finding that acceptance of population variances
would result in certain interests being underrepresented).
86 See id. at 534 (rejecting argument that consideration of practical politics can justify
population disparities); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 581 (1964) (allowing for
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ances could not be created in order to form districts with specific
interest orientations.8 7 Here too, the Court was strict in its adher-
ence to "the command of Art. I, § 2" permitting only limited and
unavoidable population variances. 8
b. State Legislative Districts
In contrast to federal redistricting plans, cases dealing with
state legislative districts have not followed any consistent stan-
dard of review.8 9 In some cases, the Supreme Court has invali-
dated a state apportionment plan because, in creating it, the legis-
lature failed to use equal population as the guiding force.9 ° In
other cases, however, the Court abandoned this principle, noting
that so long as the principle of "one person, one vote" was met, it
was irrelevant that votes were being diluted.9 ' Justice Brennan
has warned that when courts openly tolerate a wide margin of er-
ror it only serves to undermine the principle of equal
representation.92
In Reynolds v. Sims, 93 the Supreme Court held an Alabama
state legislative plan to be invalid, noting the failure to apportion
voting districts in accordance with the population.94 The Court ap-
plied strict scrutiny and established two important concepts for
evaluating an equal protection challenge to redistricting.95 The
Court reasoned that apportionment plans must provide for "fair
and effective representation for all citizens" as well as be equi-
some deviations from population based representation due to political subdivisions, but
warns this should not be taken too far).
87 See Wells, 394 U.S. at 546 (noting schemes like this one allow groups of districts with
defined interest orientations to be overrepresented at expense of districts with different
interest orientations).
88 See id. at 546.
89 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 171-73 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (finding
court failed to put forth standard which would provide guidance to legislators and courts).
90 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568-571 (upholding district court's invalidation of Alabama
apportionment scheme as not based on population).
91 See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 168-169 (Powell, J., dissenting) (finding problems with plu-
rality solely basing its finding of validity on "one person, one vote" doctrine).
92 See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 772, 779 (1973) (noting equal representation is
designed to prevent debasement of voting).
93 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964) (holding apportionment plan created by Alabama Legislature
unconstitutional since it deprived plaintiffs and other voters rights under Equal Protection
Clause of Fourteenth Amendment and Alabama Constitution).
94 See id. at 568-71.
95 See id. at 565-66 (concluding Equal Protection Clause guarantees all voters in state
elections equal participation).
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populous, following the doctrine of "one person, one vote."96 The
Court's demand for adherence to population was not extended to
matters relating to political subdivisions. 97 This exclusion was of-
fered with the caveat that legislation can affect political subdivi-
sions only when the equal population principle is not
compromised. 98
The Court reasoned that since the average citizen's greatest de-
gree of political participation is the exercise of her right to vote,
everyone must have an "equally effective voice in the election of
members of his or her state."99 The case illustrates that the courts
should take strong protective measures when analyzing suspect
redistricting plans when the force of one's vote is threatened.' 00
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court in Davis v.
Bandemer'0 ' upheld Indiana's 1981 state apportionment plan.
10 2
The Court held that as long as the apportionment plan followed
the doctrine of "one person, one vote",10 3 the state legislature did
96 See id. at 558. Underneath many of these decisions is the notion that every voter is
equal to every other voter in their state. Id. The Court required that every state "make an
honest and good faith effort to construct districts ... as nearly of equal population as is
practicable." Id. at 577; see also Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967). The Court
demanded that there be no deviations from strict equality, and threatened sanctions if
there were more than de minimus variances or if there was no justifiable state policy. Id. at
444; TRIBE, supra note 2, § 13-15. The Court in Reynolds v. Sims failed to set forth the
"requisite degree of equality". Id.
97 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578 (establishing that state legislative districts may require
use of political subdivision lines).
98 See id. at 581. The Court does allow some voice to political subdivisions, as such subdi-
visions may prevent gerrymandering. Id. It is noted, however, that this type of redistricting
can subvert the equal population principle. Id.
99 See id. at 565; see also RICHARD CLAUDE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL
PROCESS 136 (1970) (citing DONALD MATTHEWS & JAMES PROTHRO, NEGROS AND THE NEW
SOUTHERN POLITICS 234 (1966)) (stating that right to vote at that time was greatest asset
blacks in America could have as they had few other resources with respect to politics).
100 See generally Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 109 (1986) (finding Indiana's 1981
state apportionment plan was not discriminatory); Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 740-44 (finding
Connecticut reapportionment plan valid).
101 478 U.S. 109, 109 (1986) (holding Indiana state apportionment plan unconstitutional
because it diluted votes of Indiana Democrats).
102 See id. at 114-15 (explaining method legislature established districts). But see POLIT-
ICAL GERRYMANDERING, supra note 10, at 4-5 (questioning how Supreme Court held parti-
san gerrymandering was justiciable, yet failed to find Indiana's apportionment plan
unconstitutional).
103 See Davis, 478 U.S. at 118 (noting "one person, one vote" principle is enforced in
adjudicating equal protection claims regarding inequalities in populations between legisla-
tive plans); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 186 (1962) (holding that apportionment
was justiciable question); District of Columbia v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 789 F.
Supp. 1179, 1182-83 (D.D.C. 1992) (noting this case not distinguishable from apportion-
ment cases where Supreme Court held that issues are justiciable).
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not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 104 Here, the redistricting
plan appeared to be designed solely to preserve the power of the
dominant political party. 10 5 Nevertheless, the Court held the law
constitutional, applying a two part test which required the plain-
tiffs prove both discriminatory intent and effect.10 6 Since this test
was not met, the Court did not even address the issue of the ap-
propriate standard of review.' 0 7 As its rationale, the Court as-
serted that regardless of election results, the elected officials will
represent minority interests.' 0  This rationale appears to be at
odds, however, with jurisprudence suggesting that only with con-
stitutional protection of voting rights is there fair representation.
The Supreme Court has seemingly taken a "hands off" approach
to issues of state redistricting.0 9 In Gaffney v. Cummings," 0 both
Connecticut's General Assembly and a bipartisan commission had
difficulty agreeing on an adequate reapportionment plan after the
decennial census."' The District Court for the District of Connect-
icut found inequalities in both of the plans, and thus devised one
104 See Davis, 478 U.S. at 133 (noting that mandate of one person, one vote often results
in deviation from equal representation).
105 See id. at 161-62 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent found that the plurality could
only have taken into consideration the doctrine of "one person, one vote", despite uncontra-
dicted proof that certain key districts were grossly gerrymandered to make it more likely
for Republican candidates to get elected. Id.
106 Id. at 141-42 (failing to reach issue of which standard of review to apply).
107 See id. at 142 (noting Court did not reach question of state interests served by partic-
ular districts).
108 See id. at 132. Justice Powell, in his dissent, argued that there are reasons other than
the small likelihood of winning that makes an apportionment plan unjust. Id. Powell had a
problem with the Court's presumption that the elected candidate will pay heed to those
who did not elect him. Id. He also found the plurality's reasoning dubious in thinking that
members of a losing political party are going to have as much influence in state government
as those in power. Id. ". . . no one doubts that partisan considerations play a major role in
the passage of legislation and the appointment of state officers." Id. at 168; see also Charles
Backstrom et al., Establishing a Statewide Electoral Effects Baseline, in POLITICAL GERRY.
MANDERING, supra note 10, at 145. The authors called the theory of minority voters being
represented by majority party officeholders "virtual representation." Id. They found the
opinion in Bandemer to be 'dubious" as legislators cannot possibly give as much weight to
the views of their opponents as they do to their supporters. Id. But see Anderson v. Cele-
brezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 n.15 (1983) (quoting LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONSTrrU-
TIONAL LAW 774-775 (1978)). Those who make it onto the ballot will "adequately reflect the
perspective of those who might have voted for a candidate who has been excluded." Id.
109 See Gaffhey v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 749-50 (1973) (stating that courts involve-
ment in apportionment process serves little purpose).
110 See id. at 735 (validating Connecticut's legislative apportionment plan). See generally
Harry H. Nellington, Term Limits: History, Democracy and Constitutional Interpretation,
40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 833, 853 (1996) (referring to Gaffney as case upholding gerryman-
dering for state legislators).
111 See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 736, 750. See generally, T. Alexander Aleinkoff & Samuel
Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitution Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92
MICH. L. REv. 588, 651 n.148 (1993) (citing Gaffney as upholding Connecticut redistricting
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of its own." 2 The Supreme Court held that this kind of judicial
activism was outside the scope of a federal court's authority," 3
preferring instead that the states maintain a plan with minor pop-
ulation variances rather than have the courts get involved. 1 14
The aforementioned cases suggest that the Constitution has a
built in check against political gerrymandering on the congres-
sional level, but not on the state level." 5 This creates an anomaly
because state governments are permitted to do that which the
what the federal government is prevented from doing by the Con-
stitution. 1 6 To avoid this inconsistent result, the Supreme Court
must invoke a higher level of scrutiny to state legislative redis-
tricting plans to bring them into conformity with federal plans.
2. Political Gerrymandering v. Racial Gerrymandering
The manner in which the Supreme Court treats political gerry-
mandering cases is also different from the Court's analysis of ra-
cial gerrymandering cases. 7 In Shaw v. Reno,"' a districting
plan created two majority black congressional districts, which
were challenged by a group of white voters. 1 9 The Court applied
strict scrutiny 20 because the alleged discrimination was race-
plan aimed at dividing between Democrats and Republicans); Geldzahler, supra note 75, at
461-62 (providing analysis of Gaffney decision).
112 See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 750.
113 See id. The Court stated that "this very case represents what should not happen in
the federal courts." Id. State reapportionment is a job delegated to the individual state and
local legislatures. Id.
114 See id. at 751.
115 See id. at 749-50 (noting that political considerations are part of redistricting and
apportionment); Kirkpatrick v. Priesler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969) (stating Constitution
mandates equal representation with respect to congressional districts).
116 See id. at 778 (noting decision in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler is applicable to state legisla-
tive apportionment).
117 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (noting precedent has not held racial and
political gerrymanders up to same scrutiny); see also Williams, supra note 4, at 564 (re-
marking Supreme Court has taken more lenient position with respect to political gerry-
mandering than they have with racial gerrymandering by requiring population equality
and racial fairness).
118 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
119 See id. at 637 (noting contention of appellants that reapportionment plan violated
several provisions of U.S. Constitution).
120 See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1960 (1996) (deciding whether racial classifications
resulting from voting districts were narrowly tailored to further compelling state interest);
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643 (holding state legislation distinguishing citizens based solely on race
must be narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interest); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-278 (1986) (stating that in affirmative action context, racial
classifications must be justified by compelling state interest); Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (holding that when race is distinguish-
ing factor in state legislation it must be narrowly tailored to further compelling governmen-
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based.'21 The Shaw Court refused to address the political gerry-
mandering issue, instead going directly to the racial gerrymander-
ing question.122 The Court's desire to eliminate racial classifica-
tions was the reason behind finding the plan unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause. 23 The Court reasoned that
elected officials from a racially gerrymandered district would have
a tendency to represent only the members of the group that sup-
ported them. 124 This is contradictory to the holding in Davis
where the Court believed that an entire constituency would be
fairly represented by the winning candidate of a politically gerry-
mandered district. 2 ' Therefore, there is incongruous reasoning
with respect to the Court's confidence in the ultimate representa-
tion of a constituency of a politically gerrymandered district. 26
The Court appears to make no attempt at reconciling these oppos-
ing rationales.
tal interest). See generally JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
§ 14.8 (5th ed. 1995) (noting courts will require that there be compelling governmental
interests in order to uphold classifications based on race).
121 See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643 (requiring application of strict scrutiny with respect to
racial classifications due to their "odious nature" and potential for stigmatization).
122 See id. at 641 (focusing on appellant's claim that state engaged in unconstitutional
racial gerrymandering). But see Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1954 (requiring Court to scrutinize each
challenged district if race is not only factor motivating irregular district lines).
123 See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643. Perpetuating racial stereotypes "may exacerbate the very
patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to
counteract." Id. The Supreme Court characterized districts which are based solely on race
as political apartheid. Id. The Court remarked on the negative effects of racial gerryman-
dering, noting it "may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us
further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters - a goal that the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to as-
pire." Id. at 657; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1997). Racial gerrymandering is encompassed in
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Id. This section covers the infringement of the right to vote
based on race or color, deals with those who have less of an opportunity to participate in the
political process and elect representatives of their choice. Id. The purpose of the Act is to
banish racial discrimination in voting and implement the Fifteenth Amendment. Id.;
Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1902. Racial classifications are "antithetical to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, to which the 'central purpose' was to 'eliminate racial discrimination emanating from
official sources in the states." Id. (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192
(1964)).
124 See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648 (stating "elected officials are more likely to believe that
their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their
constituency as a whole"). But see Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Emptiness of Majority Rule, 1
MICH. J. RACE & L. 195, 214-16 (1996) (discussing unrealistic nature of "accountability
view" when there is no ability to put pressure on elected official).
125 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (noting person who votes for losing
candidate is adequately represented by winning candidate); see also Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971) (noting it is not considered to be denial of equal protection to deny
legislative seats to losing candidates).
126 See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648 (noting elected officials only represent those who voted for
them). But see Davis, 478 U.S. at 132 (1986) (stating that those who vote for losing candi-
dates are adequately represented by winning candidate).
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Congressional redistricting is subject to the mandates of equal
representation.' 27 Racial gerrymandering is monitored using the
highest standard of review because it involves "suspect" classifica-
tions. 128 It appears that the rationale justifying the high standard
of review for congressional redistricting plans and racial gerry-
mandering may also be used to invoke this standard for state re-
districting plans, even at the expense of compromising the notion
of a republic.
B. Lower Court Treatment of Political Gerrymandering
Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer'29 further
exemplifies the disadvantage faced by challengers of state legisla-
tive redistricting due to the low standard of review applied to such
challenges. 3 ° In upholding the plan at issue, the Maryland Dis-
trict Court recognized that although the objective for congres-
sional districts is absolute population equality, the Supreme Court
allows the states to be more flexible by requiring only "substan-
tial" population equality.13 1
The Schaefer court distinguished congressional redistricting
from state legislative redistricting cases in which the applicable
test is analogous to rational basis. 3 2 The Court applied the
Bandemer test of requiring proof of intentional discrimination and
discriminatory effect to determine whether there was unconstitu-
tional political gerrymandering. 13 3 The court held that although
plaintiffs were able to overcome the fairly low standard for estab-
lishing discriminatory intent they failed to demonstrate discrimi-
natory effect.13 4 The requirement that a discriminatory effect be
127 See Kirkpatrick v. Priesler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-32 (1969) (noting Art. I, § 2 demands
that states create congressional districts providing equal representation for equal numbers
of people); see also Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732 (1983) (noting Art. I, § 2 requires
absolute population equality for apportionment of congressional districts).
128 See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643 (holding Fourteenth Amendment requires state legislation
that expressly distinguishes citizens on basis of race to be narrowly tailored to achieve
compelling governmental interest); see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954) (noting that "the policy of separating races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the Negro group").
129 849 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Md. 1994).
130 See id. at 1033 (applying rational basis standard to state legislative redistricting
cases).
131 See id. at 1030.
132 See id. at 1033 (noting some deviations from population equality are permissible with
respect to apportionment of seats in state legislature).
133 See id. at 1038 (utilizing requirements announced in Davis v. Bandemer).
134 See id.
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shown is at odds with the guiding principles of voting rights juris-
prudence; therefore it is asserted that this test be abandoned.' 35
The Fourth Circuit, however, in Republican Party v. Martin,36
found such facts to be sufficient. 137 The Martin court found several
consequences resulting from a party having difficulty getting
elected.138 Such negative manifestations included Republicans
less inclined to run for office because of the high likelihood of los-
ing 39 and the diminishing of campaign contributions as people
did not want to contribute to candidates perceived as almost cer-
tain losers.' 4 ° The Martin court noted that despite the fact that
judges may adequately represent minority interests, this is an in-
sufficient rationale to validate political gerrymandering.' 4 ' To re-
quire that the challenging party have absolutely no voice in the
political process, as Bandemer does and as lower courts follow,
seems to be severe. It is suggested that the problem goes deeper
than having a voice, but that of not being heard.'4 2
In Republican Party of North Carolina v. Hunt,43 one of the
latest lower court decisions in the area of political gerrymander-
ing, the problem with the Supreme Court's failure to put forth a
coherent theory of constitutional adjudication of political gerry-
mandering was revealed.A4 Rulings such as these send the
message to the electorate that the Court is protecting those legis-
lators who create apportionment plans in their favor.'14 Numer-
135 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 139 (1986).
136 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992).
137 See id. at 954 (finding RPNC's complaint offered sufficient allegations of intentional
political discrimination to withstand dismissal).
138 See id. at 957 (noting RPNC presented disproportionate election results in its at-
tempt to prove discriminatory effect).
139 See id. The RPNC presented data showing the decreasing likelihood of Republicans
running for office. Id. For example, in the 1984 and 1986 elections, only four Republican
candidates contested the 40 judgeship positions. Id.
140 See id. at 957.
141 See id. at 958 (noting courts should not presume those elected will ignore interests of
underrepresented groups).
142 See id. at 1043 (identifying distinction between having voice and being heard).
143 77 F.3d 470, available in 1996 WL 60439 at *4 (4th Cir. 1996) (presenting proof of
consistent, pervasive discrimination in state's election of superior court judges was not suf-
ficient to rule in plaintiffs favor).
144 See Bernard Grofinan, Unresolved Issues in Partisan Gerrymandering Litigation, in
POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING, supra note 10, at 4 (stating, in response to Davis, that
Supreme Court gave "disgruntled political groups a hunting license for redistricting plans
they dislike, but left them in the dark as to how to bag one") (quoting CONGaESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, July 19, 1986, at 1641).
145 See Kristen Silverberg, The Illegitimacy of the Incumbent Gerrymander, 74 TEx. L.
REv. 913, 929 (1996) (noting courts have actively participated in protecting incumbents by
deferring to political gerrymanders).
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ous scholars believe that the Court can set up a standard similar
to the one used in racial gerrymandering and apply it to allega-
tions of political gerrymandering. 141 In fact, the Court in Davis
went so far as to state that these two claims regarding political
and racial gerrymandering were not distinguishable in terms of
justiceability.147
III. AFFIRMATIVE STEPS MUST BE TAKEN BY THE SUPREME
COURT
A. State Ballot Access Laws Mandate Strict Scrutiny
It is a contradiction of the democratic process to have courts
flounder in the face of challenges to state ballot access laws.
148
The random denial of potential candidates to appear on election
ballots due to inconsistencies regarding the proper standard of re-
view is unacceptable. 149 The Supreme Court does not appear to
have confidence in the American electorate as revealed in its ra-
tionale that avoiding voter confusion, by limiting candidates on
the ballot, is a legitimate state interest. 50 Courts should review
electoral regulations that potentially limit constitutionally pro-
tected freedoms with the highest degree of scrutiny. 51
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan advocated the applica-
tion of strict scrutiny to state ballot access law challenges, stating
that "when legislation burdens such a fundamental constitutional
146 See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1554 (advocating that Supreme Court has already
equated racial and political gerrymandering in cases dealing with latter, such as Reynolds
v. Sims where Court stated that "diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence
impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as in-
vidious discriminations based upon factors such as race"); see also Bernard Grofman, To-
ward a Coherent Theory of Gerrymandering: Bandemer and Thornburg, in POLrIcAL GER-
RYMANDERING, supra note 10, at 53 (suggesting that three part test applied in racial
gerrymandering case of Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) also be applied in political
gerrymandering cases because both deal with group rights).
147 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986).
148 See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 225-26 (1962) (holding political gerryman-
dering was justiciable in order to protect Fourteenth Amendment rights).
149 See, e.g., Schultz v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 633 N.Y.S.2d 915, 922 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 214 A.D.2d 224, 632 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1995) (noting that
"ballot access is the foundation of a democratic government" guaranteeing free exchange of
ideas).
150 See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (remarking that state's system
of limiting field of candidates may be necessary to ensure efficient elections); Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 780 (1983) (evaluating interests asserted by state in ballot access
law).
151 See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1960 (1996) (holding racial redistricting sub-
ject to strict scrutiny review); Porto, supra note 18, at 285 (recommending Supreme Court
adopt strict scrutiny in ballot access cases as utilized in Williams v. Rhodes).
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right, it is not enough that the legislative means rationally pro-
mote legitimate governmental ends."'512 The Supreme Court is in
the best position to set up such a standard because, in theory, it is
the only apolitical governmental branch."5 3 Furthermore, federal
and state legislators, who benefit directly from these laws, have no
real incentive to change the status quo. 15
4
The multi-factor balancing test announced in Anderson v.
Celebreeze'55 is inadequate as it leaves too much discretion to indi-
vidual courts, resulting in inconsistent applications. 56 This is ap-
parent in cases like Fishbeck v. Hechler, where rational basis re-
view was applied because the majority found the state restriction
to be reasonable, while the dissent noted the severity of the re-
strictions based upon a factual analysis. 5 7
The Supreme Court must invoke strict scrutiny, as was done in
Norman v. Reed, once the constitutional right to vote is burdened.
This would place responsibility on state legislatures to prove that
there are no other alternatives to meet the state's interest and
protect voting rights.15 8 A strict scrutiny analysis would compel
courts to identify a compelling state interest; and then determine
whether there are any less burdensome alternatives. 159
152 See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating gov-
ernmental action may only withstand constitutional scrutiny upon clear showing that bur-
den imposed is necessary to protect compelling and substantial governmental interest).
153 See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (noting president and not electorate is
responsible for nominating federal judges); TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-1 (noting role of federal
judiciary is to "interpret and enforce the Constitution as law while confined by limitation of
having power to resolve only "cases" or "controversies").
154 See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1544 (noting incumbents have high re-election rates
because they are able to manipulate voting districts to maintain their own support);
Silverberg, supra note 145, at 920-21 (according to social choice theory, those who are re-
sponsible for redistricting will most likely do so to their own political advantage).
155 460 U.S. 780, 780 (1983).
156 See Rockefeller v. Powers, 74 F.3d 1367, 1367 (2d Cir. 1995) (dealing with New York
ballot access law preventing Steve Forbes from getting onto ballot); see also Fishbeck v.
Heckler, 85 F.3d 162, 162 (4th Cir. 1996) (reviewing West Virginia ballot access law).
157 See Fishbeck, 85 F.3d at 168 (Payne, J., dissenting) (reviewing historical data from
West Virginia regarding ballot access laws and characterizing them as severe).
158 See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756-57 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that party seeking to justify burden imposed must prove that it is least burdensome alter-
native available).
159 See id. at 760.
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B. Redistricting - Strict Scrutiny as the Most Logical "Check"
Against Political Gerrymandering
Traditional guidelines, which legislators must consider when re-
districting, are already in place.' 6 ° Justice Powell's dissent in Da-
vis v. Bandemer remarks on the "pressing need for the Court to
enunciate standards" so that state legislators and judges may
have some guidance when creating and reviewing apportionment
plans.16 1 The factors Justice Powell favored included: the shapes
of voting districts, adherence to established political subdivision
boundaries"' and the nature of legislative procedures by which
apportionment laws were adopted.1 63 When using this neutral and
legitimate criteria, the states should not take into consideration
the political beliefs or party affiliations of its voters, and legisla-
tive history reflecting contemporaneous goals. 64 Justice Powell
did not find it sufficient for a court to validate a plan solely on the
doctrine of "one person, one vote."'6 5 Justice Powell also noted a
significant flaw in the discriminatory intent and effect test put
forth by the majority.166 By having election results be the deter-
mining factor, there is the possibility that a neutral redistricting
160 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 161-185 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) The
dissent believed the majority should have set out a readily identifiable redistricting princi-
ple. Id. See, e.g., Charles Backstrom, et al., Establishing a Statewide Electoral Effects Base-
line, in POLrmcAL GERRYMANDERING, supra note 10, at 151-53. The traditional factors men-
tioned in Davis were procedural and structural indicators, with the latter being broken
down into four structural measures: (1) multimember districts - "when inconsistently used"
it can be a discriminatory practice in and of itself; (2) uncompactness -when people see an
oddly shaped district they assume the lines were manipulated for a political reason; (3)
cutting subdivision lines - usually done for partisan reasons, and; (4) breaking communities
of interest - can lead to the breakup of a majority. Id. These factors, however, are not dis-
positive of discriminatory political gerrymandering. Id.; Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Dis-
tricting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 78-93 (1985). Grofman goes
through criteria for districting, which he divides into the five categories of formal, racial
intent, political intent, racial outcome/anticipated outcome, and political outcome. Id.
161 See Davis, 478 U.S. at 166 (noting that aside from applying strict scrutiny, courts
should guide legislatures on how to effectuate proper redistricting plans).
162 See id. at 176 (describing factors which Powell believes should guide both legislators
who redistrict along with judges who test redistricting plans against constitutional
challenges).
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 See id. at 168. Powell lists two potential problems with a court relying solely upon the
doctrine of "one person, one vote". Id. First, it may lead to "undue emphasis on mathemati-
cal exactitude". Id. Second, it may allow for, as this case has shown, intentional discrimina-
tory gerrymandering. Id.
166 See id. at 173 n.10.
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plan may be deemed unconstitutional if a group consistently loses
an election.
16 7
CONCLUSION
Since the right to vote is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution, this Note contends that the Supreme Court should
apply a strict standard of scrutiny to state ballot access laws and
state legislative redistricting. The most efficient way to deal with
state ballot access laws and political gerrymandering is to set
forth a solid and consistent standard, which will put state legisla-
tors and judges on notice as to what is constitutionally acceptable.
The Supreme Court dared to enter into the "political thicket" in
Baker v. Carr; now it must find its way out so that those who cre-
ate and review these state ballot access laws and apportionment
plans may follow. This Note presents an opportunity for the Court
to become the forerunner and champion of the people's right to
vote. Ultimately, the result will be a myriad of political contend-
ers with platforms that espouse more than the traditional rheto-
ric. The application of strict scrutiny to state ballot access laws
and political gerrymandering has the potential to change the
American political system as we know it so that it conforms with a
true democracy.
Jennifer R. Abrams
167 See id. at 173 n.13.
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